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MILITARY OPERATIONAL MEASURES OF
EFFECTIVENESS FOR PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS

by

Joseph Anderson
LTC, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Gerald Dillon, JMO Professor

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15. Abstract: PKO/OOTW by military forces has been the primary focus of military operations since 1982. The most recent example of U.S. troops deployed to Kosovo in support of Operation Joint Guardian demonstrates that there is not a pre-determined end state for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region. Military forces play a vital role by performing security tasks, to include humanitarian assistance, and conducting information operations and civil affairs functions. Lessons have been learned in Kosovo concerning the proper sequence of establishing law and order, coordinating interagency activities, implementing an interim government, and embedding the media. Certain operational measures of effectiveness can be used to determine when each phase of the operation is complete in order to determine when the conditions are established for the transfer of control from military to civilian authorities.			
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There has been a shifting U.S. diplomatic strategy during the past eighteen years that focuses on Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The preponderance of these operations have involved the employment of military forces in support of peace operations (PO) in places such as Lebanon, Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia, and the Sinai. The most recent example of OOTW is the U.S. troop deployment to Kosovo in support of Operation Joint Guardian. This mission clearly illustrates the thesis of this paper: military peacekeeping operations (PKO) require that specific operational measures of effectiveness (MOEs) be identified in order to effectively determine when the conditions are established for the transfer of control either to legitimate civilian authorities or other political organizations. Current events in Kosovo indicate that PKO will continue to become even more critical as the U.S. begins the 21st century. This paper will address these issues in the Balkans from the author's perspective as a former task force commander in Kosovo.

This paper will first discuss the historical background which necessitated the intervention. Although the Kosovo mission involved some peace enforcement tasks, for the purpose of this paper, the overall mission is defined as PKO. It will then analyze and discuss the military security tasks, information operations (IO) and civil affairs (CA) functions conducted by Task Force (TF) Falcon, the U.S. contingent, in Kosovo. The paper will conclude with lessons learned and recommended MOEs for future PKO.

Background

Events in the Balkans can be categorized as ethnic conflicts and must be viewed as a different form of warfare. The United States and its military community will be involved in such wars, whether by choice or default. It is therefore incumbent on those with a responsibility in these matters to pay close attention to the nature of ethnic conflict and determine how most effectively to use the dual pillars of diplomacy and force in support of peace and justice.¹ It is critical to articulate the desired end state for an ethnic conflict

¹Pauletta Otis, "Ethnic Conflict: What Kind of War Is This?," Naval War College

before establishing the conditions to be met for successful transfer of control from military to civilian agencies. The end state for an ethnic conflict is limited to one of the following solutions: suppression or defeat of the insurgents or of the dominant power; de facto partition; autonomy; or independence.² Both Bosnia and Kosovo required the separation of warring parties by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to create conditions for a political accommodation. The goal of NATO in Kosovo is to allow the Albanians, the regional minority, to control their destiny through regional autonomy in the areas where they form a majority of the population.

U.S. security interests in the Balkans include preventing the spread of violence in the region, preventing the collapse of Europe's security structure, and defining NATO's role in the post-Cold War era.³ PKO support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. They take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. A credible truce or cease-fire must be in effect and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. The military's main function is to establish a presence to inhibit hostile actions by the disputing parties and to bolster confidence in the peace process.⁴

PKO also support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normalized peaceful relations.⁵ The difficulty in achieving this aim in Kosovo is the lack of a unified truce among the Serbian regular (VJ) and paramilitary army and ministry of interior defense (MUP) forces, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rebel

Review, Autumn 1999, 27.

²"Roots of the Insurgency in Kosovo," AUSA Background Brief, June 1999, 7.

³Walter N. Anderson, "Peace with Honor: Enduring Truths, Lessons Learned and Implications for a Durable Peace in Bosnia," The Land Warfare Papers, September 1999, 4.

⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.3) (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 1999), II-1.

⁵*Ibid*, II-1.

forces, and NATO. Credibility was weakened by signing two separate military annexes to the peace agreement between the two different parties. A Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was signed on June 10, 1999 between the Serbs and NATO. This document provided for the phased withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo in three phases: Zone 1 (the southern third of the province) from D-Day to D+5; Zone 2 (the middle third of the province) from D+5 to D+9; and Zone 3 (the upper third of the province) from D+9 to D+11. Another document, The Undertaking, was signed on June 20, 1999 between the KLA and NATO. This agreement also provided a phased procedure for the demilitarization of the KLA. From K-Day to K+7, the KLA was prohibited from conducting any military operations. From K+7 to K+90, the KLA was required to move all remaining personnel into authorized assembly areas and begin the process of moving arms and equipment into authorized storage sites according to a thirty and sixty day timeline. From K+90 on, the KLA was to no longer be recognized as an organization within Kosovo.

Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the 37,000 man NATO-led contingent deployed to the region to monitor both the MTA and The Undertaking. KFOR is commanded by an allied three star general who is headquartered in Pristina, the provincial capital, and is divided into five sectors of responsibility: U.S., British, French, Italian, and German. The U.S. is responsible for the southeastern portion of the province with all forces operating under the command and control (C2) of TF Falcon. The mission of TF Falcon is to maintain law and order, secure the lines of communication (LOCs), provide humanitarian assistance support, and facilitate transition of the provincial government and infrastructure back to legitimate civilian authorities in sector. TF Falcon is an ad hoc coalition under the command of an Army brigadier general. The coalition consists of one U.S. infantry battalion, one mechanized battalion, and one armored battalion; a Greek mechanized battalion; a Polish airborne battalion; and a Russian airborne battalion. These units

currently rotate every six months. The TF is well manned and equipped to deal with local military forces in its assigned area of operations (AO).

Military Security Tasks

The first challenge for the operational commander during PKO is the differentiation between crimes committed due to ethnic violence and those that occur as a result of normal domestic situations. Events in Kosovo indicate that ethnic crimes generally included murder, assault, kidnapping and arson while domestic crimes normally involved assault, rape and larceny. The types of crime in Kosovo have changed over time as military forces monitored the treaties and the parties to the dispute became separated and demilitarized. There was a direct correlation between the status of the agreements and the types of crime that were being committed. The ethnic situation stabilized as the timelines and milestones for the agreements were met and domestic crime became more prevalent.

The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used to maintain law and order in the U.S. sector are in accordance with joint doctrine. To successfully perform their mission, peacekeepers must have freedom of movement, open access to all areas in their operational area, and the ability to freely patrol, observe, monitor, verify, and report their findings.⁶ A combination of foot and vehicle patrols are used by TF Falcon in sector to monitor compliance of the agreements, to deter acts of violence and to determine the ethnic mix throughout the area of operations. These patrols are an effective means to show military presence in areas of concern. Special Forces teams are also used to conduct area assessments and to provide information on the ethnic populations and leadership in the sector. Search and seizure operations against homes and property are conducted based on probable cause in an attempt to capture weapons, ammunition, and other contraband. A black list to identify suspected war criminals has been published and

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.3) (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 1999), II-25.

distributed for use in the process of arresting, detaining, and processing these individuals for potential war crime tribunals. Curfews are imposed in population centers where violence and crime are most evident. A vehicular quick reaction force (QRF) is maintained at all times to rapidly and forcibly respond to any threats against peaceful coexistence, violations of the agreements, interference with freedom of movement in and throughout the sector, and other serious incidents.

There are other supporting tasks associated with the maintenance of law and order. The first involves the protection of returning refugees, which number in the tens of thousands. Most Albanian refugees have returned to the province and have no place to live due to either arson or vandalism. Camps have been established by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), to provide shelter for the homeless. These camps require security to prevent retaliation by Serbs. Another factor concerns the protection of Serbs who are leaving the province to return to Serbia. Many of them camp near municipal facilities while awaiting transportation out of Kosovo.

The second supporting task involves the protection of key facilities. Examples include hospitals, public utilities, factories, and government buildings. The resumption of normal operations in these facilities is critical to restoring economic and political normalcy in the region and their protection is also critical to the preservation of many public and private documents. These documents have and will continue to serve as evidence in resolving disputes and discrepancies over land ownership and other claims.

Security of the LOCs is accomplished through the use of vehicular patrols, an air QRF, and the use of traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks. This is a more difficult task due to the size of the sector, which is approximately the size of the State of Rhode Island. TCPs are an effective tool for searching vehicles and monitoring the flow of refugees across the Macedonian border. Vehicular patrols are useful in reducing obstacles and

conducting show of force operations. The air QRF provides a UH-60 helicopter platform for responding to arson strikes and other serious incidents. Apache helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also excellent sources of information and intelligence on the routes in sector.

Humanitarian assistance support is provided in a variety of ways. The most significant effort is the medical support provided to minefield victims and other life, limb, or eyesight threatening emergencies. This was critical upon entering the province when other facilities and air or ground evacuation capabilities were simply not available. This was an important step toward winning the hearts and minds of the people. Another tremendous effort was provided by the engineers in assisting with demining operations. Engineers are prohibited by international law and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) from physically clearing minefields, but they are able to provide demolitions and technical support to the United Nations (UN) teams. The engineers did clear homes and facilities of booby traps and other hazards.

The third form of assistance is the military escort of NGO and PVO relief convoys in the sector and the use of military transportation assets to expedite the movement of food, clothing, and other supplies in support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This NGO is focused on the return of the Albanians to their homeland and has prioritized resources toward the repair of roofs and the patching of windows and doors with plastic. Materials to repair homes, such as wood, glass, and tile are precious commodities and they have to be secured by military forces. The only recourse for many families is to live with friends and relatives in homes that were not as severely damaged during the conflict.

Information Operations

The second challenge for the operational commander during PKO is to establish a positive relationship with the civilian population and to influence adversaries to refrain from the use of force. IO are used in Kosovo in accordance with joint doctrine to degrade

the Albanian and Serbian ability to respond to KFOR operations in order to restore the peace.⁷ Commanders determined themes and messages that could be used to synchronize IO throughout their AOs. Themes and messages served as a mechanism to guide all elements in each of the TFs toward achieving mutually supporting objectives with regard to the peaceful coexistence of the society. These themes and messages were given to units for their use as they interacted with the local populace. Themes were broad statements supporting the mission and they normally represented essential components of the end state or final objective that the commander was attempting to attain. An example of a theme used in Kosovo was that all military leaders would be held accountable for their actions. Messages directly supported the themes by specifying detailed actions that were associated with these themes. An example of a message that supported the theme used in Kosovo was that military leaders that chose to violate the provisions of the MTA or The Undertaking would be prosecuted in accordance with international law.⁸

The most important IO forum used by the TF Falcon Commander was the Joint Information Committee (JIC). This committee conducted a weekly meeting held at a hotel in Urosevac to discuss either progress with treaty implementation or issues with the execution of the agreements and a plan of action, with milestones, for the continued evolution toward a peaceful and functional society. Members of the JIC included U.S. sector commanders, selected TF Falcon staff members, KLA zone commanders, and Serb leadership representatives. The basic themes that were disseminated to the JIC included that peace was a prerequisite for the restoration of normalcy in the region and that both KLA and Serbian atrocities would not be tolerated. The JIC allowed the TF Falcom Commander to provide policy and procedural guidance and it gave parties to the dispute

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Joint Pub 3-11) (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1998), II-9.

⁸"Information Operations," Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, October 1999, 7-8.

an opportunity to voice their concerns. Numerous follow-on negotiations and meetings occurred throughout the sector as a result of this weekly gathering.

Another important IO program that was established throughout the AO was the creation of Regional Information Centers (RICs). The purpose of these RICs was to provide both a place and point of contact for the local populace to interact with the military chain of command. Each RIC was staffed with an officer-in-charge (OIC), who was usually a battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO), and each RIC was manned by fire support element personnel. Each RIC was staffed differently, but each one generally had linguistic, medical, military police (MP), and CA support personnel. The functions of the RIC were to serve as a central point to document incidents, research and respond to complaints or concerns, and react to public safety needs and requirements. The RIC also served as a source of information for the local people and helped spread the message that KFOR would respond to complaints regardless of ethnic background. It also emphasized that everyone was responsible for keeping the peace. The RICs provided an excellent means to assess regional stability while building the trust and confidence of the people.

A very critical aspect of IO in theater are radio interviews with local radio stations conducted by battalion TF commanders, executive officers and staff members. These interviews are arranged by the psychological operations (PSYOP) staff representative and are conducted on Sunday afternoons. The PSYOP representative receives the questions from the interviewer two days prior to the event and relays themes that TF commanders want to cover during the interview. Responses are prepared by the PSYOP staffs to ensure coordination. A CA or PSYOP translator is always present to avoid confusion and to ensure that themes are transmitted in a convincing and accurate manner. Official press releases that discuss events, policies, or programs are also provided to local stations for broadcast. The radio stations are paid for conducting the interview or broadcasting a release after they air to ensure that the plan was followed and that emotions and politics

are removed from the process. These radio broadcast procedures used in Kosovo are very similar to those employed by TF Eagle in Bosnia.⁹

The final aspect of IO worth mention is the importance of giving information to the media for outside consumption. The TF Falcon Commander established a Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) as an efficient means of dealing with the press, media, and other visitors, such as congressional leaders. The horror of the suffering in Kosovo, not unlike other places such as Somalia, and the role of American forces in this setting are certainly destined for worldwide attention. The responsibility of sharing situational awareness with the media is a basic and important function in an age where information affects those military activities conducted with the concurrence of the international community.¹⁰ The public affairs office (PAO) staff is very effective in determining and disseminating media themes in the JVB that cover Serbian compliance with the MTA, mitigating reaction to mass grave site and minefield reports, urging both military and public cooperation with KFOR, and monitoring KLA adherence to The Undertaking. Military commanders host reporters on a daily basis and give them open access to unit activities. Press conferences are also conducted to provide updates on military operations in the sector.

Civil Affairs Functions

The third challenge for the operational commander during PKO is defining and restoring some sense of normalcy in the region as part of the post-conflict resolution phase of the mission. CA assets perform in accordance with joint doctrine by providing advice in the formulation of procedures to help create a basis for cultural accommodation and expediting compliance with the agreements.¹¹ CA personnel provide the expertise in

⁹"IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment," Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, January 1999, 14.

¹⁰Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 1995), 86-87.

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Civil Affairs (Joint Pub 3-57) (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1995), II-10.

making the overall assessment of the region and form the liaison with the local civilian leadership, but the interaction with NGOs has become a more important factor in this process. There are currently 335 aid agencies operating in Kosovo.¹² Unfortunately, military ties to NGOs in PKO are not very structured. Previous operations illustrate that many NGOs view the military as out of touch with the values and members of the society they seek to protect, while military personnel tend to see NGOs as undisciplined and an obstacle to their duties. These sentiments are no different in Kosovo. The reality is that the number of NGOs continues to increase and they are usually the first to enter a country and the last to leave. NGOs often have better local knowledge than military forces and they are able to bypass the local political bureaucracy in getting things done. NGOs also consist of organizations with varying degrees of competence and political motives. They are likely to resist attempts by the military to coordinate and control their activities and often differ on the best approach to solving a problem.¹³ All of these factors indicate that modern PKO are complex, multifaceted missions that require closer coordination between civilian and military elements to be successful.¹⁴

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established by the TF Falcon Commander at Camp Bondsteel, the TF headquarters, to synchronize information and coordinate interagency activities. The CMOC served as a C2 center for the CA teams attached to each battalion TF. The primary functions of the CMOC were to establish an interim regional government, restore both the industrial and agricultural economic base, and manage resources and assets. The CMOC also strived to reopen and efficiently maintain and operate both the public service and public utility portions of the infrastructure. The principle elements of public service included the medical system,

¹²Steven Erlanger, "Kosovo still in the grip of terror, intolerance," The New York Times, 22 November 1999, 1.

¹³Michael C. Williams, "Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping," Adelphi Paper, no. 321, 38-40.

¹⁴Ibid, 67.

transportation network, and schools. The most vital utilities included electric power, water, and telecommunications.

The first TTP used to orchestrate the reconstruction of the province occurred at the TF level. CA personnel chaired a daily meeting with the representatives from all of the participating NGOs and international and regional security organizations at the RICs. The purpose of these meeting was to establish priorities of work and to allocate scarce resources among many competing demands and agencies. The predominant U.S. government agency in Kosovo is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID has the largest financial base in the region; however, the shortfall of financial backing is present in almost every endeavor in the province at the PVO and NGO levels. The goal of the CA teams is to ensure unity of effort in applying limited resources to numerous needs.

The difficult task was, and remains, the restoration of control back to civilian authorities. The challenge concerns the determination of exactly who the legitimate authority should be and the definition of normalized, peaceful relations. Two organizations existed in Kosovo prior to the bombing campaign and now work effectively with the CA teams to establish an interim provisional government. One is the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), an element from the U.S. Department of State. The second is an NGO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Both of these organizations have been a valuable source of intelligence for KFOR and make significant contributions during the one-on-one negotiation process between KFOR commanders and the various factions in the province. Both organizations also had extensive contacts in the region due to their previous presence in the area and understood many of the political, ethnic, and religious sensitivities of the people. They worked diligently with military commanders, CA teams, and UN administrators in the formulation of a combined Albanian and Serbian interim government. The registration of citizens still

must occur before any elections can be held. There is currently a plan for this procedure, but it is not yet financed.

International organizations, such as the UN, have already been somewhat effective in initiating economic redevelopment in Kosovo. Examples include making the German mark an official currency, in addition to the Yugoslav dinar, appointing judges and international jurists for a new legal system, and imposing new customs duties to help finance administrative functions. Bosnia is an excellent example of the linkage between socio-economic conditions and PKO. Improving living standards was one means of easing tensions between the warring factions.¹⁵ CA personnel in Kosovo, just as in Bosnia, continually monitored the repair and reopening of small businesses and stores, the number of privately owned garden plots and commercially owned farms, the price of goods in the open market and the fees for services, and the amount of vehicular traffic in and around the cities in order to assess and manage the degree of economic recovery. KFOR is committed to getting the factories opened and reestablishing the work force. The one significant difficulty that remains is the inability to pay salaries for services rendered and manufactured products. KFOR is also committed to restoring self-sufficiency by assisting farmers with resuming their normal harvest. CA assets are dedicated to repairing tractors and other equipment and obtaining resources, such as fuel, to prepare the fields for planting. CA personnel are instrumental in getting the public transportation system, to include trains and buses, operational by managing fuel, schedules, and loads. KFOR also works with the International Medical Cooperation (IMC) and Doctors Without Borders to restore the local hospitals to normal operating capacity. The hospitals are critically short of supplies and equipment, although medical personnel are reasonably available. The same situation applies to opening schools. Efforts are constantly made to accumulate supplies

¹⁵Richard J. Newman, "Why NATO Counts Cabbages in Bosnia." U.S. News and World Report, 26 August 1996, 36.

and repair the structures; teachers are also available to resume classes. These are all indicators of normalcy, at least from the economic standpoint, and are useful in the decision making process of prioritizing and applying external assistance towards quality of life issues. Getting people off of the streets and productively engaged in their lives is the first step toward restoring economic normalcy.

Restoring utilities is a much more difficult proposition. The underlying problem with the electric, water, waste removal, and telephone services was exacerbated by their substandard operational capability prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign. The first requirement was to determine the causes of failure in each of the services following the hostilities. The reasons for failure ranged from a poor infrastructure that existed prior to the start of the war, to bomb damage, to sabotage as a result of ethnic tensions. Most utilities required extensive repairs or replacement of items such as pipes, generators, or microwave towers. The second requirement was to pool resources to acquire the needed materials or labor to repair the infrastructure. CA personnel consolidated work requests, managed the labor and contractor work force, and procured supplies and equipment. One recent example involved an inventory of the pipe factory in Urosevac to find the proper gauge pipe to repair the city's water line. Once the correct pipe was located, military personnel first transported the pipe to the damaged section of the line and then worked with NGOs to repair the system. This exemplifies the ongoing process to repair the region's infrastructure. This process will require continued time, patience, and resources to improve the existing public services.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The first lesson learned concerns who should take the lead in gaining and maintaining law and order in a PKO prior to withdrawing military forces. This involves essentially a three stage approach. The first stage of maintaining law and order routinely involves the deployment of regular combat troops to neutralize ethnic violence. These troops provide the necessary force to either enforce or monitor the military provisions of a peace treaty.

This stage should begin immediately upon the cessation of hostilities and end when ethnic violence is replaced by domestic crime.

The second stage of maintaining law and order involves the prevention of domestic crime. The force should be led by MPs. MPs are routinely tasked with law enforcement duties both during peacetime and war. They are better trained than combat soldiers in skills such as traffic control, arrest, detainment, and investigation. Augmenting TF commanders with additional MPs to perform these duties allows combat forces to concentrate on treaty implementation, i.e., demilitarization and humanitarian assistance. However, the problem with this augmentation is that it pulls an already stretched MP force from garrison requirements or taps into overextended reserve forces to perform these tasks. Regardless of who performs the mission, a squad of MPs attached to a 1000 person battalion TF, as is the case throughout TF Falcon, is clearly not enough to facilitate law enforcement procedures. This stage should begin when there is a sufficient number of MPs in the AO to perform this task and end upon the arrival of an international police force.

The third, and most difficult, stage of maintaining domestic law and order should involve the use of an interim international police force, followed by the training and integration of a local police force. Neither of these forces have yet to fully materialize in Kosovo. European nations made a commitment to deploy a 5,000-person international police force to help patrol Kosovo. To date, that force numbers only about 2,500.¹⁶ The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been more successful in establishing the Kosovo Police Service, but has not fully integrated them into law enforcement activities or sustained its program. The first class that graduated on October 16, 1999 had 173 new officers from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.¹⁷ This stage should begin when an

¹⁶Matthew Cox, "You call this Soldiering?," Army Times, 27 March 2000, 16.

¹⁷Associated Press, "Kosovo police school turns out first class," The Providence Journal, 17 October 1999, 6.

international police force takes responsibility from the MPs and when there is a sufficiently trained host nation police force prepared to conduct routine domestic law enforcement duties. The integration of these assets and their total engagement in law enforcement activities is a prerequisite for U.S. troop withdrawal. UN administrators are responsible for this process and they have not been successful in coordinating their efforts with the international community or KFOR commanders.

The MOE for identifying the level and types of crime is closely linked to statistics. The crime rate in Kosovo has been significantly reduced since the arrival of KFOR. According to the NATO Secretary-General's report, "Kosovo One Year On," there are currently about five murders a week compared to fifty a week in June 1999.¹⁸ Although there is no such thing as an acceptable level of domestic crime, events in Kosovo indicate that these crimes have decreased. This statistic serves as an indicator that it is time to shift responsibility for law enforcement duties from KFOR to international and host region police forces.

The second lesson learned is a follow-on to the first. The UN coordination problem with the police forces is indicative of a larger problem concerning the synchronization throughout the province of a broad spectrum of administrative functions. It is fundamentally a problem of who is in charge and how best to control and coordinate all organizations that are operating in a given region, including UN, NATO, NGOs, and PVOs. The MOE for this problem is the formulation of a joint and combined staff under the coordination of UNMIK and under the supervision of the provincial UN administrators. This process is fairly straightforward from the UN and KFOR perspective, but will require more cooperation among the NGOs and PVOs. Each of these organizations should be categorized by function, i.e., medical or relief, and be represented

¹⁸Suzanne Daley, "Report heralds successes in Kosovo, downplays failures," The New York Times, 22 March 2000, 2.

by a lead organization. Organizations with the largest financial backing will tend to dominate their respective functions. The standard operating procedures for the staff can be determined and developed over time, but the staff's ability to direct administrative efforts for the common benefit of all concerned parties will certainly enhance, and hopefully expedite, the transition of control back to legitimate civilian authorities. Organizations that do not comply with established procedures should be banned from the province by the international community or be isolated from the support provided by the collective body operating in the region.

The third lesson learned is the requirement to make the interim government work. The true MOE for transition between military commanders and civilian leaders is a general election. Once again, this requires a phased approach. Military commanders take responsibility for their respective AOs upon occupying the province. The first phase requires commanders to immediately deal with all factional leaders on an equitable basis and to form a combined group of representatives in each of the municipalities. Initially forcing both sides of a dispute to work together toward a common goal is critical to establishing an interim government. The determination and acceptance of common goals is a challenging and dynamic process while attempting to restore political legitimacy. Military efforts to restore public services in Kosovo, for example, aligned factions within the disputed territory toward a common goal. This process eventually led to the identification and cooperation of representative leaders, which in turn allowed UNMIK to move toward the second phase of forming an interim government. These efforts assisted the interim governments in performing their duties.

The prerequisite MOE for conducting subsequent elections is getting the population registered. An option that was not employed to at least begin the registration was the use of the RICs. The RICs became very active nerve centers for the municipalities and could have been used to document names and addresses of the public without any cost. The process of issuing identification cards would have incurred a cost, but the facilities and

manpower were readily available to accomplish that task. OSCE and KFOR leaders disagreed at the outset of the normalization process as to when an election could be held. Military leaders urged OSCE to pursue elections within six months of NATO occupation of the province; OSCE personnel believed that elections would not be an option for at least one year. The use of the RICs would have expedited the election timeline.

The final lesson learned involves the influence that the media has on all aspects of military operations. There are two schools of thought concerning military interaction with the media. One school basically proposes a non-working relationship with the press. This essentially means that the press is denied access to many operations and gets their information from second-hand sources. Information is disseminated in a "pull" rather than a "push" fashion. The other school of thought, better known as the embedded media program, welcomes media involvement in all operations to portray images and stories as they actually occur. This technique tends to lend credibility to operations and enhances the overall effectiveness of getting the message out to the public. The embedded media program allows reporters to live and travel with commanders and units throughout the AO and to see and feel the emotions and difficulties that TF Falcon forces face each and every day. It is much more meaningful and effective for the media to decipher and exploit information for world consumption under more favorable conditions. Open access to all activities tells the real story and helps spread the positive nature of operations versus the negative one. This policy had a very favorable outcome on operations in Kosovo. The MOE for gauging a successful media policy is the existence of a functional embedded media program.

TF Falcon has consistently executed its mission well throughout the past eleven months. Operational commanders should examine the lessons learned from this experience that have been discussed in this paper and adopt the accompanying recommendations in future PKO. The mission in Kosovo will more than likely endure as long as the ongoing effort in Bosnia for many of the same reasons. Military leaders are

qualified and capable of negotiating the security aspects of a treaty. Effective IO and CA programs assist military commanders with enforcing, monitoring, and implementing the provisions of a treaty. However, the task of developing and restructuring the political and economic infrastructure of an affected region requires the assistance and cooperation of many other organizations. The lack of a coordinated and synchronized effort by these organizations will lead to reduced credibility and effectiveness of U.S. efforts to provide long-term stability.

U.S. military forces are expertly prepared to conduct PKO as an element of U.S. diplomatic strategy. This fact has been established repeatedly throughout the past eighteen years. The greatest concern continues to be the task of restoring some form of normalcy with limited resources and dealing with competing demands that are usually associated with functions outside of military jurisdiction. This reality affects everything from establishing an elected government to providing humanitarian assistance. Organizations such as NATO and the UN must be better prepared to provide sufficient political and economic support to adequately resolve a crisis; problems like Kosovo are not going away anytime soon. The simple reality is that in the next century minorities will be increasingly unwilling to live with borders to which they have become arbitrarily assigned by history when the conditions seem intolerable.¹⁹ Operational commanders can significantly enhance their chances for overall success in future PKO by applying the proposed MOEs and implementing the recommendations made in this paper.

¹⁹Graham Fuller, "More Kosovos," The Washington Post, 4 May 1999, A23.

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